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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CONFLICT OF LAWS-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DETERMINATION OF
PLACE OF ACCRUAL OF ACTION TO ENFORCE LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS
IN INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS-Suits in equity were brought in the federal
dis~ct cgurts of Ohio and Pennsylvania against resident shareholders of Banco
Ken~cky Company, a bank-stock holding corporation. The purpose of the
litigation was to enforce an assessment under the National Bank Act 1 on the
shares of an insolvent national bank which Banco owned. 2 Ohio and Pennsylvania have six.year statutes of limitations on such an action.11 They also ,hav~
borrowing statutes, barring suit on a cause of action no longer enforceable in
the jurisdiction in which it arose.4' The bank had been authorized to conduct its
activities in Louisville, Kentucky, had engaged in business in no other place,
and its receivership had been administered there. The Kentucky limitation was
:five years. 5 Suit in each case had been ,commenced about five and a half years
after the cause .arose. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the cause
of action arose in Kentucky and that suit was barred, 6 while the Third Circuit
Court disagreed. 7 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held the judgment in
the sixth circuit affirmed and that in the third reversed. Anderson v. Helmers,
(U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1340.
In an action at law to enforce a liability created by federal statute providing
no period of limitation, a_ federal court follows the applicable limitation statute
of the jurisdiction in which it sits.8 Similarly the state statute applies to an
action in equity where a primarily legal obligation is to be enforced and the
equitable j:!lrisdiction is merely concurrent.9 The cause of action in the instant
Rev. Stat. (1878) § 5151, 12 U.$.C. (1940) § 63, and 38 Stat. L. 273 (1913)
u.s.c. (1940) § 64.
2 ln Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 64 S. Ct. 531 (1944), it was decided
that since the receiver had been unable to recover on a judgment against Banco, its
individual stockholders might be held liable.
8 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 11222; 12 Pa. Ann. Stat. (Purdon,
1931), § 31.
4 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938) § 11234; 12 Pa. Ann. Stat. (Purdon,
1931) § 39.
,
5 Ky. Rev. Stat~ (1946) § 413.120.
6 Helmers v. Anderson, (C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 156 F (2d) 47.
7 Anderson v. Andrews, (C.C.A. 3d, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 972. Both cases are
noted in 60 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1946) and 32 CoRN. L. Q. 276 (1946).
8 Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 15 S. Ct. 217 (1895); McClaine
v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 25 S. Ct. 410 (1905).
9 Wilson v. Koontz, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 202 (1812); McDonald v. Thompson,
184· U.S. 71, 22 S. Ct. 297 (1902). In purely equitable proceedings, the state
limitation applies where federal jurisdiction is based solely on diversity grounds,
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945), but where that
1
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case arose when payment of the assessment became due under the order of the
Comptroller of the Currency.10 But the narrow issue, namely, where that
cause of action arose, has not b'een previously litigated. The present action
being transitory, in the absence of a borrowing statute the issue would not have
been material. The usual conflict's rule that an action once accruing is to be
governed by the limitation statute of the forum would then have applied.11
The .finding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was that the action did
not arise in Kentucky "any more than it did in any other one of the states
of the United States.m2 This determination was based on a concept of a liability
created by federal statute, enforceable against the shareholders regardless of
territorial considerations and not to be affected, limited or restricted by ordinary
state rules of law. This premise in effect refutes the initial one, that where
the federal law is silent state limitations apply. Further, if the cause of action
arose under the laws of, and within, the United States, it must have arisen within
the territorial limits of a particular state or the District of Columbia, and in
view of the borrowing statute, the limitation of that territorial jurisdiction
should apply to the present Pennsylvania proceedings.. In the present case the
assessments were to be paid at the receiver's office in Louisville. The Sixth
Circuit Court stressed the shareholders' failure to perform this obligation as the operative fact giving rise to the cause of action and this omission,
occurring in Kentucky, determined that the action also arose there. The
Supreme Court did not base its affirmance on this ground alone, and, in
fact, refused to decide whether direction "to pay at a particular place could
alter the conclusive situation as to where a cause of action might be said to
'arise' under other circumstances." 13 The court justified its .finding on the
occurrence of a number of potentially operative facts within. Kentucky, primarily the bank's engaging in business exclusively within that state, and the
administration of the receivership there. This cumulative analysis and the
result here reached seem entirely rational. Ordinarily, a cause of action is
localized for purposes of venue or to determine what substantive law applies
In the present case, assuming that the cause had not been made actionable by
federal law, the only jurisdiction whose substantive law might control and
jurisdiction arises from the enforcement of a federally created liability, state limitations
may be ignored, the only bar being !aches. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,
66 S. Ct. 582 (1946). This gives rise to an anomalous situation in recovering assessments against bank stockholders. The liability for assessments under 39 Stat. L. 374,
§ 16 (1916), 12 U.S.C. (1940) § 64, on stock of federal land banks can be enforced
only in a representative suit in equity, there being no provision for determination of the
amount of the assessment by the receiver. Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 58
S. Ct. 350 (1937). It is submitted that the obligatin is just as fundamentally a legal
one as the liability in the instant case and that the procedural difficulties which necessitate exclusive equity jurisdiction should not require the totally different result reached
in Holmberg v. Armbrecht. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in Todd
v. Russell, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 169 at 175.
10
Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 61 S. Ct. 473 (1941); Fisher v. Whiton, 317
U.S. 217, 63 S. Ct. 175 (1942).
11
3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 604.1 (1935).
12
Anderson v. Andrews, (C.C.A. '3d, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 972 at 975.
18
Principal case at 1343.
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possibly afford a cause of action would have been Kentucky. If, for substantive
purposes, the action could have arisen only in Kentucky, similarly, for the
purposes of a borrowing statute, it must also have arisen ~here. The necessity
of the present litigation accentuates some rather glaring inconsistencies resulting from our dual system of jurisprudence. It would seem that one area where
uniformity is most to be desired would be iq the operation of federal statutes
creating substantive rights. Yet, while Banco's stockholders are immune from
suit in Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, they may well be amenable in
jurisdictions having no borrowing statutes, if the ordinary limitation period has
not expired. This will also hold true in other situations, as federal statutes
typically fail to provide limitation periods on their enforcement.14 The simple
expedient of a general federal limitation statute applying to the enforcement
of substantive rights created by federal statute and not otherwise barred, would
provide the des'ired uniformity and prevent much protracted litigation.
Edwin F. Uhl, S.Ed.

14 I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 240 (1938). For a discussion of the problem,
the various suits in which it arises, the disparities in the applicable limitations, and
possible solutions both by judicial decision and legislative action, see 49 YALE L. J.
738 (1940).

